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25 NOV 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
THROUGH: DDCI  
SUBJECT: Status of CIA Participation in the  
NRO Staff

1. The NRO staff is dominated by Air Force officers detailed to Secretary McMillan's office, and we have all wished for a more broadly based decision making group for the NRP. At our NRO budget review session of 22 October 1963, you directed McMillan to include additional CIA people in his NRO staff. It is my understanding that he countered several days later with three specific needs which you told him in no uncertain terms were unresponsive to your request. You then directed General Carter and me to have a detailed meeting on NRO staffing, which was held on 7 November 1963 in McMillan's office. John Bross joined us but Fubini was not present.

2. The meeting was in two parts: descriptions of the various NRO components and possible participation roles for CIA personnel. Colonel Worthman described the NRO staff and Programs A, C and D (see attached) in extremely brief form. Colonel Ledford described Program B (OSA) and I gave McMillan a comprehensive view of DD/S&T, in which he showed great interest as a place in which to accomplish NRO business. However, he was disturbed and continues to be so, according to Kiefer, that he cannot see how he can task the components of DD/S&T in a "line way" to his own satisfaction. I suggested that he let me know what he felt needed to be done and I would arrange it.


3. We then turned to specific staffing requests, after reducing the group to McMillan, [redacted] (his aide), Carter, Wheelon and Bross. Brock put forward the following specific suggestions for CIA assignees: 25X1

NRO review(s) completed.

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a. A CIA contracts man to work for General Greer in Los Angeles to handle the black CORONA contracts which he intends to transfer to Program A. We all agreed that this added very little to CIA participation in the NRO staff and this was really a service to General Greer if he is successful in acquiring CORONA.

b. A CIA officer who could support McMillan on aircraft operations in the NRO staff. [redacted] has been trying to recruit unilaterally [redacted] Ledford's Chief of Operations, for this job.) General Carter inquired what contribution this would make in view of Ledford's integrated capability. It became apparent through discussion that this man would serve as a check on operational planning developed for the Special Group by Ledford.

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c. A technical man to work for General Greer in Los Angeles in his Advanced Projects office. This post is now held by Captain Frank Gorman (USN) and is responsible for what advanced planning is done on satellite systems. McMillan indicated that he is not satisfied with Gorman's performance and would be willing to groom a CIA man as his replacement. I suspect, but cannot be certain, that he would like [redacted] for this job. [redacted] would be good but his assignment would leave DD/S&T without its coagulated point for its own growing collection development program. We inquired at some length why the NRO advanced planning activity was centered under General Greer rather than the NRO staff, and were told that: (1) it required a contracting capability, (2) it should be in the midst of the other satellite work, and (3) he wanted to keep the NRO staff small. These arguments were not convincing, but we should give serious thought to staffing such a spot if it is properly located.

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4. We then turned to John McMahon, who has found it "untimely" to join Kiefer in NRO for some months. We suggested that McMahon might well join the Comptroller, [redacted] since the control of a [redacted] program is certainly more than a part time job. McMillan turned this over for NR several minutes and decided that it would not be appropriate.

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because: (a) he would want McMahon to be available to support [redacted] in all of his duties, (b) some of [redacted]

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Brock countered with a proposal that McMahon might be placed somewhere under Martin doing plans and programs work, but displayed no real enthusiasm.

5. I then inquired how Gene Kiefer fitted into this structure. McMillan was quite candid in saying that NRO decisions were made between himself and General Martin, and readily agreed that this left Kiefer between two "do-it-yourselfers". I suggested that perhaps Kiefer ought to become the Chief of Staff when Martin leaves (summer '64), but McMillan rejected this promptly.

6. McMillan then tabled an open preference for Air Force officers who have served with CIA as the only workable way to inject CIA thinking into NRO affairs. Carter pointed out that such officers serve tours at CIA so as to bring flying talents to CIA and seldom develop the deep appreciation for intelligence needs that a career CIA officer would bring to the staff. McMillan pointed out that he had no control over CIA (or NSA) people on this NRO staff and indicated that he should write their fitness reports, with which I agreed.

7. I judged this meeting to represent an all time low in NRO/CIA relations, and this view was amplified considerably by Carter and Bross. It was made abundantly clear then and later (through Kiefer) that McMillan has no intention of establishing a truly joint staff. Under the circumstances, I am most reluctant to send additional people to join Kiefer in their sterile role until a satisfactory understanding is reached on the over-all NRO problem. I am convinced that it is quite unrealistic to expect Kiefer and widely distributed and subordinated CIA staff members to create a peaceful re-orientation in the face of clearly expressed Air Force intentions to dominate this field and McMillan's desire to rely on Air Force staffing.

8. We can proceed with a plan to reorganize the NRO staff with more equitable participation, but this leads

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one immediately to the patchwork of unsymmetrical Programs within the NRO. I submit that a genuine change in NRO as a whole will prove very little more difficult than trying to "shoe-horn" individuals into positions of responsibility.

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ALBERT D. WHEELON  
Deputy Director  
(Science and Technology)

Attachments:  
As stated


Distribution:  
1 - DCI  
2 - DDCI  
3 - Mr. Bross  
4 - Dr. Wheelon

Attachment 1

NRO Staff

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The NRO staff structure, as described by Colonel Worthman, is shown on the organization chart below. The Comptroller, [redacted] reports directly to McMillan. All others report through General Martin. The staff is small [redacted] plus clerical) and is focused almost exclusively on satellite programs. The largest group is the Satellite Operations Center under [redacted] with [redacted]. The Deputy for Plans and Policy has [redacted] and is concerned with NPIC, ACDA, etc., relationships. The Deputy for Systems, [redacted] appears to supply the only technical and programmatic direction for actual programs. It is clear that Mr. Kiefer has no line responsibility and I have shown him as a staff element.



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Attachment 2

Notes on the NRO Programs:

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1. Program C



2. Program D

This is run by Colonel Leo Geary and was originally devoted to supporting CIA aircraft operations. It was stated that Geary is supported only by a Security Officer and a Contracting Officer. I suspect that he relies on Wright Field for his development support. No further information on the responsibilities or resources of Program D was offered.

3. Program A

This is General Greer's organization for the development of all Air Force satellite systems. It is a small organization (100 people) who have project responsibility for all payloads except CORONA. An organization chart is given below which indicates the diversity of interests he has.

General Greer also has a second responsibility as Vice Commander of the Space Systems Division of the Air Force Systems Command under General Schriever. I gather that is only in the second role that he has direct authority over THOR Agena and ATLAS Agena boosting capabilities. Apparently General Greer has one hat in working for Secretary McMillan on reconnaissance payloads and another hat in working with SSD. I found this arrangement very confusing and question whether the separation is real or apparent.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY

22 NOV 1963

*Projects  
NRO  
1963*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, DIA  
THE DIRECTOR, AFIC

I am directing the AFIC to make an assessment of the adequacy of photographic imaging products furnished to the intelligence community by the NRO. This is to be limited to domestically processed photographic products from KAP operations.

I would appreciate your designation of one individual each from your respective agencies to serve in a liaison capacity to a small working group to accomplish this investigation. I am planning this group of three or four individuals to meet in the AFIC via direct contact with processing and intelligence centers. Your comments on the attached preliminary outline of the study will be appreciated.

(Signed)

WILLIAM J. FULTON  
Director  
National Reconnaissance Office

cc - Chairman USIB (OASD)  
Director, Program "A"  
Director, Program "B"

Attachment

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ABSTRACT OF NEW PROCESSED PHOTOGRAPHIC FACILITIESPURPOSE:

1. Determine and report the views of principal users of processed photographic products of the IRO as to adequacy of these products for their purposes. Items of concern are:
  - a. Uniformity of quality
  - b. Quantities received
  - c. Timeliness of receipt
  - d. Adequacy of auxiliary data
  - e. Suitability of format
  - f. Division of processing between IRO general purpose facilities and individual user special purpose facilities.
2. Examine the procedures now used to ensure and report quality, and their contribution to the control of quality.

APPROACH:

Assessment and evaluation of current products, of users' views regarding these products, and of methods and procedures, by very small group of IRO personnel via direct contact with processing centers and user installations. Coordination could be established with USIB, COMUS, DIA, as appropriate.

Establish liaison directly, and also via IRO staff participation on present Ad Hoc COMUS DIA Quality Improvement Working Group. The assessment directed here should make use of, but not duplicate, activities of that Group; findings of this evaluation may be of some use to that Group.

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RESULT:

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Findings in the form of recommendations for continuance or changes to present ways and means of analyzing processed photographic products of the MW to principal users, should be reported to the DMO.

Any changes required to improve the accuracy and reporting of quality, in order to insure continued quality control, should be pointed out.

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23 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

1. Just a reminder that you are on the hook for an in-house study in connection with the Director's conversation with Secretary Johnson and Jerry Wiesner to develop an Agency position on whether or not the U. S. Government should surface and admit the fact that it is taking photographs from satellites and, if so, to what extent; i. e., quality, resolution, frequency, results, etc. In preparing this paper, please coordinate very closely with DD/S&T and the Office of Security and present the pros and cons.

2. The Director will want to see this about Monday, 6 January.

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Deputy Director

## Distribution:

Original - DD/I  
1 - DDCI  
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Cy#1 Series "B"

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